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Using the results of a national identity survey, we test the impact of religious affiliation on trade and 
immigration-policy preferences of U.S. residents while controlling for individual level of skill, political 
ideology, and other important demographic characteristics. Our results show that religion is an important 
determinant of international-policy preferences as individuals who are pre-Vatican II Catholic or 
members of a fundamentalist Protestant denomination are more likely to prefer policies that restrict 
imports and immigration. Religiosity, in contrast, has a separate effect of moderating attitudes toward 
immigration. In addition, we find evidence of denominational effects among African Americans in that 
members of fundamentalist denominations tend to favor policies that restrict imports while others do not, 
implying that statistical results commonly attributed to racial effects may actually be a religion effect.  
 
Valuable comments and insights were provided by Jim McGibany, participants of the Third Annual Conference on 
Religion, Economics, and Culture, and two anonymous referees.    1 
  
 
GOD AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:  RELIGION AND ATTITUDES 
TOWARD TRADE AND IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Introduction  
Since Max Weber’s study of the Protestant ethic, scholars from a wide variety of academic disciplines 
have debated the effects of religion on a nation’s economic performance.  Recently there is a renewed 
attention to the relationship between religion, international relations, openness and economic growth [for 
summaries of the literature see Welch and Mueller (2001), Dark (2000), Iannoccone (1998), and Smith 
and Sawkins (1998)].  Grossman and Helpman (2000), make clear the importance of understanding 
societal ideas and preferences and the role of special interest groups in shaping international policy.  Yet, 
Philpott (2002) argues that until September 11, international political-economy scholars have paid 
relatively little attention to the role of religion.  Nonetheless, a recent study on American views of 
globalization (PIPA, 2000), however, shows that views on globalization are affected by moral beliefs and 
varying degrees of confidence in a market-based system.
1  Some also take the view that globalization is a 
threat to religious beliefs in that globalization leads to “foreign” values supplanting local ones (Foreign 
Policy, 2004).   
In this study we examine the relationship between an individual’s affiliation with a particular 
religious denomination and their preferences over trade and immigration policies.  In a manner similar to 
Milner (1988), we focus on individual attitudes and not policymakers’ actions and, therefore, do not 
account completely for trade and immigration policy outcomes.  Implicitly, we follow Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales (2003) who argue that religious beliefs are low frequency variables−based on religious 
teachings and conditioned by the cultural environment of the religion−that affect adherents’ attitudes 
toward the economic system. We, therefore, hypothesize that fundamentalist denominations, on the one 
hand, are networks that generate Putnam’s (2003, p. 23) bonding social capital−or strong in-group 
loyalty−while generating antagonism toward those outside of the fundamentalist network.  Liberal and 
moderate Protestant denominations, on the other hand, are bridging networks that are less threatened by    2 
  
modernization, generate relatively more outward trust, and are less likely to be antagonistic towards 
outsiders.  This view is perhaps best represented by a recent Financial Times article (Financial Times, 
May 14, 2004, p. 4) on trade and the U.S. economy in which a textile worker is quoted as saying: 
“I am very worried about the ways things are going.  The jobs are disappearing.  We need 
to get back to a biblical perspective of taking care of our own.” 
 
Although trade and immigration policy decisions do not hinge on public opinion alone, they are an 
important element in international policymaking [see Graham (1994) for a forceful argument].  We argue 
that religious affiliation is an important and often neglected force that shapes and reinforces these 
attitudes.  
Using data on the 1,367 International Social Survey Policy respondents of the 1996 General 
Social Survey, we estimate ordered-probit models of the responses to questions as to whether the United 
States should restrict imports and whether the United States should increase or reduce immigration.  
While testing denominational and religiosity effects, we control for citizenship, gender, social class, 
resident of south census region, race, union membership, political ideology, education, and whether the 
respondent is employed in a sector with a comparative advantage or disadvantage. 
Our empirical results, in general, show that religious affiliation is indeed a statistically significant 
determinant of trade and immigration-policy preferences.  Specifically, individuals who are members of a 
fundamentalist Protestant denomination or pre-Vatican II Catholic are more likely to favor policies that 
restrict imports and immigration.  Regarding Catholics, however, we show that there is a statistically 
significant difference in the attitudes of pre-Vatican II Catholics and post-Vatican II Catholics.  Likewise 
there is evidence that African Americans affiliated with fundamentalist denominations are more likely to 
favor policies that restrict imports while African Americans not affiliated with a fundamentalist 
denomination do not.  The heterogeneity of our results shows the importance of disaggregating Protestant 
denominations and controlling for changes in attitudes that occurred among older and younger Catholics.  
Consequently, previous research that ignored the role of religion may have overstated the importance of 
other factors such as race and region.      3 
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section I we discuss the economic 
consequences of religious participation and why religion might matter for international-policy 
preferences. In Section II we outline recent models of individual preferences for trade and immigration 
policies.  In Section III we describe the data used in the study.  In Section IV we explain our econometric 
approach and provide results.  Finally, we offer a conclusion and suggestions for further research in 
Section V.  
 
I.  Religious Affiliation, Participation and Attitudes toward International Policies 
In an extensive survey, Iannaccone (1998) separates studies of economics and religion into three 
categories.  The first line of research deals with the micro-foundations of religious participation, the 
second addresses the economic consequences or outcomes of religious participation, while the third line 
of research invokes religious teachings to critique economic policies.  This study is in keeping with the 
second area of research.  The reader is referred to Iannaccone for a comprehensive review of the literature 
in all three areas.   
A.  Religion and Economic Performance 
There are a number of prominent empirical studies of the economic consequences of religious affiliation 
on economic activity and growth in the literature. Because of space considerations, we highlight but a few 
relevant papers here.  The most recent studies on the link between religious participation and economic 
outcomes include Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003), who employ survey data covering sixty-six 
countries.  The authors find that religion promotes the development of positive attitudes toward 
cooperation and the rule of law and government that are conducive to economic growth.  In contrast, they 
also find that religious individuals are less tolerant of women working and more racist.  By controlling for 
the dominant religion in each nation, they show that these effects differ across denominations.   
In a similar manner, Barro and McCleary (2003) use survey data covering fifty-nine countries and 
find that economic growth is positively affected by religious beliefs, but negatively by church attendance 
even while controlling for possible reverse causation.  In a similar manner, Mehanna (2002) finds that    4 
  
countries whose dominant faith is Protestant tend to be more open, as measured by imports as a 
percentage of GDP, than Catholic or Muslim nations. 
B.  Why Would Religion Matter for Trade and Immigration? 
According to religion and sociology scholars such as Ammerman (1991), Marsden (1991), and Tamney 
(2002), modernization, industrialization, and urbanization of the early twentieth century challenged both 
the moral certainty and social dominance of traditional Protestantism.  The fundamentalist movement 
was, therefore, a religious-based social movement counteracting encroaching secularism and 
modernization.  Coreno (2002, p. 337) argues that “… fundamentalists often form small interconnected 
independent denominations in the hope of protecting a quarantined traditionalist culture inside a network 
of church-based institutions.  They nourish these enclave communities by separating themselves as much 
as possible from mainline churches in particular and secular culture in general.”  He adds that southern 
fundamentalist denominations, in particular, support a stronger sense of separatism.  Moderate and liberal 
Protestants, in contrast, are less threatened by secular society and tend to thrive more in a modern world.  
They are also less concerned with biblical inerrancy and tend to treat religious beliefs as more personal 
and private.   Further, moderate or mainline denominations tend to relate more inclusively with other 
denominations and engage more in ecumenical activities. 
  In regard to Catholics, Putnam (1993) argues that the hierarchical structure of the Roman 
Catholic Church in Italy hinders cooperation and trust of outsiders.  Welch et al. (2004), in contrast, claim 
that, at least since Vatican II, there is no reason to expect that Catholics would trust “outsiders” any less 
than mainstream Protestants.  They claim that the American Catholic Church is substantially different 
from the Church in Italy, and that most U.S. Catholic parishes do not maintain a rigid boundary against 
the outside culture.  They further argue that there may well be a difference among Catholics who were 
socialized into pre-Vatican II traditions relative to the younger group of post-Vatican II Catholics.   
  Generalizing these various studies, we hypothesize that different religious denominations, or 
networks, generate different types of social capital and, therefore, that the differing approaches of 
Fundamentalist, moderate, and liberal Protestant denominations toward modernization and encroaching    5 
  
secularism will be reflected in differing attitudes of individual members towards others outside of the 
individual’s religious network.  More specifically, we argue that fundamentalist denominations, on the 
one hand, are networks that generate Putnam’s (2003, p. 23) bonding social capital−or strong in-group 
loyalty−while generating antagonism toward those outside of the fundamentalist network.  Liberal and 
moderate Protestant denominations, on the other hand, are bridging networks that are less threatened by 
modernization, generate relatively more outward trust, and are less likely to be antagonistic towards 
outsiders.  In addition, the effects of Vatican II are likely to have moderated the bonding-network aspect 
of Catholicism in favor of greater acceptance of those outside of the Catholic network. 
Theories on social trust are important for understanding the impact of religiosity, or the frequency that 
an individual participates in a religious network.  Delhey and Newton (2002) survey the main schools of 
thought on social trust.  Voluntary Association Theory postulates that direct interaction with others on a 
sustained basis in voluntary organizations builds social trust. Because participation in religious 
organizations is the predominant form of voluntary association in the United States, religiosity may also 
condition individuals’ attitudes toward trade with others outside of the religious network and acceptance 
of immigrants into their communities.  In other words, voluntarily participating in a religious network is 
likely to generate the bridging type of social capital referred to by Putnam (2000, p. 23), with “broader 
identities and reciprocity.”  Hence, we hypothesize that individuals who participate more in their 
respective religious networks, regardless of affiliation, are less likely to favor policies that restrict imports 
and immigration. 
Globalization is one present-day challenge to cultural boundaries forcing an awareness of increasing 
global connectedness (Pieterse 2004).  Because of this challenge to their traditionalist culture, we suspect 
that members of fundamentalist denominations are more likely to oppose trade with others and more 
likely to desire restrictions on immigration, while members of liberal and moderate Protestant 
denominations are less likely to oppose trade with others and restrictions on immigration.  In regard to 
Catholics, it is possible that changes in Catholic social teaching brought about by Vatican II will be    6 
  
reflected in differences towards trade and immigration policies in that post-Vatican II Catholics are more 
accepting of those outside of their religious network and hence less likely to favor restrictions on trade 
and immigration.  Finally, religiosity may have a different and separate effect than affiliation.  
 
II.  Modeling Individual Trade and Immigration Policy Preferences 
Recent examinations of trade and immigration-policy preferences focus on two common models of 
international trade policy preferences: the Ricardo-Viner model and the Heckscher-Ohlin model.  Both 
theories consider the effect of increased trade on input factors’ returns and provide a framework to 
explain how individuals evaluate the effect of international trade on their income.  Because the literature 
is extensive, we focus only on the most recent and otherwise refer the interested reader to the surveys 
provided in Scheve and Slaughter (2001a and 2001b) and Daniels and von der Ruhr (2003).   
Scheve and Slaughter employ individual-level survey data for the United States to identify if 
individual skill level or factor type is a significant determinant of trade-policy preferences.  In the course 
of their analysis, they make an important contribution by showing that education, income, and 
employment classification all serve as a proxy measure of skill level.  Hence, only one of these variables 
should be included in any model of trade or immigration policy preferences.  Their major finding is that 
factor type rather than sector of employment influences trade and immigration-policy preferences.  Other 
demographic characteristics, entered as tests of the robustness of factor type, such as gender, race, and 
trade union membership were also found to be significant determinants.   
Daniels and von der Ruhr directly extend the analysis of Scheve and Slaughter to ten advanced 
economies.  Using both education and relative earnings as alternative measure of individual skill level, 
they find that skill is a robust determinant of individual preferences on immigration policies across 
countries.  In two additional and broader cross-country working papers, Mayda and Rodrik (2001) apply 
ordered estimation techniques to explain attitudes toward trade and immigration using education as a 
measure of the individual’s level of skill while O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) use the individual’s    7 
  
occupation classification.  Both papers find support for the factor endowment model.  Hence, any study of 
trade and immigration-policy preferences should control for individual skill level. 
 
III. Survey Data  
The data employed in this study are the results of a survey conducted and compiled by Zentralarchiv für 
Empirische Sozialforschung as the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) titled ISSP: National 
Identity.
2  In the United States, the ISSP is administered as part of the General Social Survey, but only a 
subset of the GSS participants are administered the ISSP questionnaire.
3  The combination of both the 
ISSP and the GSS surveys yield a unique data set as the 1996 ISSP portion contains questions on imports 
and immigration while the GSS portion contains, in additional to standard demographic data, detailed 
information on the individual’s religious affiliation and religiosity.  Though information on religious 
affiliation is reported back to the ISSP, the GSS makes much finer distinctions among denominations that 
are not found in the ISSP data.  Because of the uniquely heterogeneous nature of religion in the United 
States, these distinctions are not available for other countries in the ISSP data and, therefore, we limit our 
analysis here to residents of the United States.   
A.  Description of the Dependent Variables  
The first survey item used in this study asks: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: The United States should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national 
economy?”  Five possible responses range from agree strongly to strongly disagree.  The second item 
asks: “Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States nowadays should be increased or 
decreased?”  Five possible responses rage from increased a lot to reduced a lot.  Those who could not 
choose or refused to answer the questions were coded as missing.  Table 1 provides the survey items on 
policy preferences, summarizes the responses, and indicates the proportion of missing observations.  
Table 1 
B.  Description of the Independent Variables     8 
  
Following the literature, we control for a number of factors that may shape an individual’s international 
economic policy preferences.  In general, we control for demographics, individual skill level, sector of 
employment, and political ideology, while testing the significance of religious affiliation and religiosity.  




1.  Demographic Variables 
NonCitizen is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is a citizen with a value of zero or 
non-citizen with a value of unity. It is expected that non-citizens are more likely to oppose policies that 
restrict trade and favor policies that increase immigration.  Female is a dichotomous variable that takes 
the value of unity for female and zero for male.  Previous studies find evidence, though not consistently 
significant, indicating that women are more likely to support trade barriers, but that gender is not a 
significant determinant of immigration-policy preferences.  Age is a continuous variable.  It is 
hypothesized that older respondents are more likely to favor policies that restrict international trade and 
immigration, though age has not been shown to be a consistently significant determinant of global 
economic policy preferences.   
Social Class is the individual’s perspective of their soci-economic status.  It is a discrete variable 
that ranges in value from unity for lower class to six for upper class.  South is a dummy variable for the 
south U.S Census region.  Individuals in the other three regions, therefore, serve as the benchmark for the 
estimated differential impact of the south.  The research on religion and economic growth indicates that a 
dominant religion affects the culture of a nation and may be the source of cross-country differences in 
attitudes toward markets and market processes.  Hence, if a particular religion dominates a region of a 
nation, we may see a regional effect that is actually reflecting the influence of the dominant religion along 
the lines suggested by von der Ruhr and Daniels (2004).  Previous research finds that individuals who live    9 
  
in “gateway” communities–communities that are typical destinations of immigrants–are not more likely to 
oppose immigration.   
African American is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of unity if the respondent is 
African American and zero otherwise.  The literature provides mixed evidence on the role of race and 
ethnicity as determinants of trade and immigration policy preferences.  Union Member indicates if the 
respondent and / or their spouse is a member of a trade union with a value of unity and zero otherwise. 
Numerous studies of U.S. residents conclude that trade union members are more likely to favor restricting 
international trade, but union membership is not a significant determinant of immigration-policy 
preferences.
4   
2.  Political Ideology 
For a comprehensive discussion of political ideology and attitudes toward globalization see Steger (2002 
Chapter 4).  Previous studies show that those who identify with the far right are more likely to favor 
policies that restrict trade and are more likely to favor policies that restrict immigration.    Similar to 
previous studies, we model Political Ideology with a categorical variable that ranges from unity 
(indicating someone who views their political ideology as far left), to five (indicating someone views their 
political ideology as far right).   
3.  Individual Skill Level and Sector of Employment 
Scheve and Slaughter (2001b) show that, if controlling for political ideology and demographic 
characteristics, education or earnings are appropriate measures of labor market skills and should be 
included as an economic factor as opposed to a demographic factor.  More importantly, they show that 
education and earnings should not be included in the same model.  Because of the number of missing 
values–294 for earnings as opposed to 3 for education–we use education as a proxy measure of individual 
skill throughout the paper.  Nonetheless, in general, our results are the same for both education and 
earnings (available upon request).  Education is a continuous variable that indicates the number of years 
of schooling the respondent has completed.  Based on standard trade theory, described earlier,    10 
  
respondents with lower levels of education (skill) are more likely to agree with policy actions that restrict 
trade and immigration.   
  Individuals that are employed in sectors at a comparative advantage in the global market may be 
less likely to favor restrictions on trade and immigration while those employed in sectors at a comparative 
disadvantage and, therefore most threatened by trade and immigration, may favor restriction.  To control 
for sector of employment, we follow Mayda and Rodrik (2001, Appendix II), using the adjusted net 
exports of a sector as an indicator of comparative advantage or disadvantage.  First, we use data on export 
and import shares of U.S. manufacturing sectors at the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
as found in Campa and Goldberg (1997).  In contrast to Mayda and Rodrik, we also measure the export 
and import shares of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries using data from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, and we proxy for mining, using export and import shares for the coal industry from the 
National Mining Association. 
We create two dummy variables using the data above in combination with the 1988 Standard 
Industrial Classification three-digit code contained in the GSS data.  The first variable, Comparative 
Advantage, assigns a value of unity to respondents employed in industries with a positive adjusted net 
export measure and zero to all others.  The second variable, Comparative Disadvantage, assigns unity to 
individuals in industries with a negative adjusted net export measure and zero to all others.  The base 
group, therefore, is individuals employed all other industries and assumed to be non-trading industries. 
4.  Religious Affiliation 
The survey instrument asked individuals if they belong to a major religious group.  There were 
approximately 30 denominations the individual could identify with including Catholic, Jewish, Moslem, 
major Protestant denominations, Shinto, Hindu, Buddist, and Sikh.  Individuals were also allowed to 
select no affiliation or to refuse to answer.  In our sample, individuals identified with Catholic, Jewish, 
Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Episcopalian, other Protestant, and two refused to answer and were coded 
as missing.  The frequency of attending religious services, Religiosity, is included in each model    11 
  
containing religious affiliation.  This variable ranges from zero for individuals that do not attend at all 
during the course of a year to eight for those who attend more than once a week. 
As previously indicated, the GSS provides additional coding for individuals that took part in the 
ISSP, allowing much finer distinction of religious affiliation in the United States.  The National Opinion 
Research Center (NORC) provides a classification scheme of Protestant denominations along the 
fundamentalist-moderate-liberal spectrum, and GSS Methodological Report Number 43 provides details 
and a complete listing of denominations in their respective categories.  According to Smith (1987, 1990), 
the NORC framework uses biblical inerrancy, beliefs in the personal salvation or born-again experience, 
beliefs in the personal and imminent return of Christ, evangelical or revivalist attitudes, and acceptance of 
traditional Protestant beliefs such as the existence of angels and devils, as metrics to separate 
denominations along the fundamentalist – liberal spectrum.  Using this classification system, we re-
estimate the empirical models to determine if there are differential effects among Protestant 
denominations along the fundamentalist to liberal spectrum.     
C.  The Second Vatican Council 
The Second Vatican Council represents the most significant change in Catholic doctrine and Catholic 
social teaching in the past 450 years.  Scholars such as Roof and McKinney (1987) and Greeley (1981) 
document the differences in attitudes among older Catholics and younger Catholics following Vatican II 
on issues such as premarital sex, divorce, and birth control.  In addition, the percentage of Catholics 
attending a parish school declined following Vatican II.  Regarding the impact of Vatican II on economic 
attitudes, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (page 34) argue that some of the negative impact of Catholicism 
on economic development no longer exists and that more moderate post-Vatican II Catholicism is not a 
significant obstacle to economic development.  If indeed religious affiliation is an important determinant 
of individual attitudes, then these important changes should be reflected in the data.  Specifically, we 
expect post-Vatican II Catholics to have more moderate attitudes toward trade and immigration policies.   
To investigate a potential Vatican II effect, we follow Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales and separate 
Catholics into two cohort groups, those born before 1962 and those born after, creating a dummy variable    12 
  
equal to unity if the individual is Catholic and in the particular age-cohort group.
 5  To control for a 
potential generational shift that could be captured by, and attributed to the Vatican II controls for 
Catholics, we include a dummy variable for all non-Catholics born after 1962.  Hence, the control group 
is all non-Catholics born prior to 1962.   
 
IV. Econometric Results 
Our objective is to determine if an individual’s religious affiliation holds any additional insight into their 
trade and immigration-policy preferences.  Our approach, therefore, is to add religious affiliation and 
religiosity to the models of international-policy preferences described earlier, thereby controlling for other 
important individual demographic, economic, and political characteristics.  Given that the multiple 
categories of responses to the survey questions follow a natural order, we use an ordered probit model.   
To try to understand the importance of religion, differing denominational effect, interactions with 
race, and the impact of Vatican II, we estimate five different models of each dependent variable.  The first 
model is a base model that allows us to benchmark the results of our data and allow comparison with the 
literature.  The second model adds the individual’s major religious affiliation and religiosity.  The third 
model separates Protestants along the fundamentalist to liberal spectrum.  The fourth model separates 
African Americans into two cohort groups; those in a fundamentalist denomination and all other African 
Americans.
6  The fifth examines the potential impact of Vatican II on Catholic’s attitudes toward trade 
and immigration policies. Because some Protestant denominations are not coded by the NORC into the 
fundamentalist to liberal scheme, some observations are lost moving from model to model.  The number 
of observations for each model is included at the bottom of each table of results. 
A.  Attitudes toward International Trade Policies 
Table 3 provides the ordered-probit estimates for the survey item on whether the United States should 
restrict imports.  As with other ordered choice models, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients of the 
ordered probit models are notoriously difficult to interpret.  In this section we discuss those coefficients 
that are significant.  In section D, we simulate the relative effects of the key variables.      13 
  
Table 3 
The results of the base model, model 1, indicate that older respondents, respondents residing in 
the south, African Americans, union members, respondents who identify their political ideology to the 
right, and respondents employed in sectors at a comparative disadvantage are more likely to agree with 
policies that restrict imports.  The base model also indicates that nonresidents, respondents who identify 
their social class to the upper end of the scale, and more-educated respondents are less likely to agree with 
policies that restrict imports.  Similar to Mayda and Rodrick, employment in a sector with a comparative 
advantage is not significant. 
Model 2 shows that Catholics are more likely to favor policies that restrict imports but that 
Protestant, Jewish and other religions, and religiosity are not significant.  Model 3 illustrates the 
hypothesized difference among Protestant denominations with fundamentalist more likely to favor 
policies that restrict imports while moderates and liberal are not statistically significantly different from 
the base group (of individuals that do not profess an affiliation with a religious denomination).  Note that 
in model 3, African American is no longer significant.  Hence, in model 4 we separate African Americans 
into cohorts of those who belong to a fundamentalist denomination and those that do not.  (We also 
remove fundamentalist African Americans from the fundamentalist Protestant group.)  Model 4 shows 
that the typical assumption that African American opposition to free trade is racially based may be 
incorrect, and that this opposition is driven by religious affiliation, similar to white fundamentalists.   
Model 5 separates Catholics into pre-Vatican II and post-Vatican II cohort groups and adds a 
control for all non-Catholics born after Vatican II. Hence, non-Catholics born prior to Vatican II is the 
base group for these cohort variables.  The results in model 5 show that pre-Vatican II Catholics are more 
likely to favor policies that restrict imports while post-Vatican II Catholics and all others born after 
Vatican II are not statistically significantly different from the base group.
7
B.  Attitudes toward Immigration Policies 
Table 4 provides the estimates for the immigration models.  The estimates for the base model indicate that 
older respondents, individuals that identify with lower social classes, those who identify their political    14 
  
ideology to the right, and lower educated respondents are more likely to support policies that restrict 
immigration, while noncitizens and African Americans are more likely to favor policies that increase 
immigration. 
Table 4 
Model 2 adds the major religious denominations and the results indicate that Protestants are more 
likely to support policies that restrict immigration while greater religiosity actually moves individuals to 
prefer policies that increase immigration.  This result for religiosity supports the hypothesis that greater 
participation in a religious network builds bridging social caption and a broader sense of identity and 
reciprocity and that affiliation and religiosity are two separate effects. 
Model 3 separates Protestants into moderates, liberals, and fundamentalists.  The results indicate 
that the statistically significant result for Protestant is due to fundamentalists’ favoring restrictions on 
immigration.  The impact of belonging to a fundamentalist denomination is highlighted to a greater 
degree in model 4 which shows that the result for African Americans pertains only to those not affiliated 
with a fundamentalist denomination.  Finally, model 5 indicates that pre-Vatican II Catholics are more 
likely to favor policies that restrict immigration while post-Vatican II Catholics and all other post-Vatican 
II respondents are not.  It is important to note, however, that introduction of the post-Vatican II dummy 
increased the significance level of fundamentalist while making liberal Protestant marginally significant, 
raising suspicion that there may be a generational effect not fully captured by our models.   
C.  Interpretation of Model Estimates 
To better understand the impact of religious affiliation on global-policy preferences, we simulate the 
effect of key variables so as to isolate the impact on the probability that an individual chooses one of the 
responses to the survey questions detailed in Table 1 (along the lines suggested in King et al., 2000). The 
simulations are conducted using Clarify: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results 
(Tomz et al., 2001).  The process involves drawing 1,000 simulated parameters from an asymptotic 
sampling distribution that is multivariate normal, and whose mean is equal to the vector of parameter    15 
  
estimates and variance equal to the variance-covariance matrix of estimates.  Next the simulated 
parameters are used to calculate two sets of probabilities.   
Using religious affiliation as an example, we first re-estimate model 5 and then set all binary 
explanatory variables at their majority value (so that female is equal to one while noncitizen, south, 
African American, Union Member, comparative advantage and comparative disadvantage are equal to 
zero), all denomination variables at zero, and the remaining variables at their mean value.  In other words, 
the “typical” individual in our data set is treated as if they have no religious affiliation.  From this we 
generate the predicted probability of response to each category of the survey question.  Next, we change 
every individual’s affiliation to, say, fundamentalist and repeat the simulation generating new predicted 
probabilities.  To get a sense of the relative importance of religious affiliation, we include the simulated 
effects of a one-standard-deviation reduction in education−shown in previous studies as a highly 
significant determinant of trade and immigration-policy attitudes−as a benchmark.  The changes in 
predicted probabilities for variables of interest are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.     
1.  Policies to Restrict Imports 
Figure 1 shows the change in predicted probabilities for the five categories of the question on restricting 
imports for model 5 in Table 3.  In general, the figure shows how each variable of interest shifts the 
distribution of probable responses upward, that is, toward the categories of “agree strongly” and “agree” 
away from the categories of “neither agree nor disagree,” “disagree,” and “disagree strongly.”  The mean 
value of education is approximately 13.5 years.  We change this variable to its 25
th percentile 
value−approximately 12 years−to obtain the marginal effects of education.  Next, education is set at its 
mean value again and all respondents are coded as fundamentalist and the probabilities are simulated 
again.  This is then repeated for pre-Vatican II Catholics.   
Figure 1 shows that the denominational effects rival that of education, as pre-Vatican II increases 
the probability that an individual will agree strongly with policies that restrict imports by more than 9.5 
percent and fundamentalist by more that 7.5 percent, while a one-standard-deviation reduction in    16 
  
education (from 1.5 years of post-high-school education to a high-school education) increases this 
probability by 4.5 percent. For the category of “agree,” however, the changes are 4.1, 3.7, and 5.7 percent, 
respectively.  Nonetheless, the religion effects dominate the education effect in three of the five 
categories.  To present this in another way, education would need to be reduced to ten-and-one-half years 
(from the mean of thirteen-and-one-half years) to generate the same impact on attitudes as these two 
denominational effects. 
Figure 1 
2.  Policies to Change Immigration into the Respondent’s Country 
Figure 2 illustrates the change in the simulated probabilities for the various response categories for 
education, fundamentalist, pre-Vatican II Catholic, and religiosity.  As the figure shows, the pre-Vatican 
II effect is relatively larger than religiosity and education as the probability that they support policies that 
reduce immigration a lot increases by 10.9 percent.  If the individual belongs to a fundamentalist 
denomination, the increase is 10 percent, and if education is reduced by one-and-one-half years it is 3.6 
percent.  The simulation for religiosity represents an increase from the mean value by plus one standard 
deviation (from attending services roughly one a month to nearly every week).  The effect of  this 
increase in religiosity is to decrease the probability that an individual will favor policies that restrict 




In this paper we argue that religious affiliation is an important and often neglected force that shapes and 
reinforces attitudes toward trade and immigration policies.  We hypothesize that different religious 
denominations generate different types of social capital and that the differing approaches of 
Fundamentalist, moderate, and liberal Protestant denominations toward modernization and encroaching 
secularism will be reflected in differing attitudes of individual members towards others outside of the 
individual’s religious network.  More specifically, we argue that fundamentalist denominations, on the    17 
  
one hand, are networks that generate Putnam’s (2003, p23) bonding social capital−or strong in-group 
loyalty−while generating antagonism toward those outside of the fundamentalist network.  Liberal and 
moderate Protestant denominations, on the other hand, are bridging networks that are less threatened by 
modernization, generate relatively more outward trust, and are less likely to be antagonistic towards 
outsiders.  In addition, the effects of Vatican II are likely to have moderated the bonding-network aspect 
of Catholicism in favor of greater acceptance of those outside of the Catholic network.  Because 
globalization challenges cultural boundaries and traditionalist culture, we suspect that members of 
fundamentalist denominations are more likely to oppose trade with others and more likely to desire 
restrictions on immigration.  Furthermore, changes in Catholic social teaching brought about by Vatican 
II will be reflected in differences towards trade and immigration policies in that post-Vatican II Catholics 
are likely to be more accepting of those outside of their religious network and hence less likely to favor 
restrictions on trade and immigration.  Finally, religiosity may have a different and separate effect than 
affiliation effects.  
Using the results of a survey of national identity of U.S. residents, we test the impact of religious 
affiliation on trade and immigration-policy preferences while controlling for the individual’s level of skill, 
their political ideology, and other important demographic characteristics.  Our results show that 
individuals who are pre-Vatican II Catholic or members of a fundamentalist denomination are more likely 
to prefer policies that restrict imports and immigration.  Furthermore, religiosity has a separate effect of 
moderating opposition toward immigration.  In addition, we find evidence of denominational effects 
among African Americans in that members of fundamentalist denominations tend to favor policies that 
restrict imports while others do not, implying that statistical results commonly attributed to racial effects 
may actually be a religion effect.  
Based on our results, we conclude that religion does matter, and that the beliefs produced by specific 
religious denominations shape public opinion toward trade and immigration thereby representing an 
important source of resistance to deeper cultural interaction.  It is our hope that this paper will motivate    18 
  
greater interest in the subject of religion in the context of international policies.  For example, if religion 
is important to economic performance, what is the process through which religious beliefs eventually 
move into policy outcomes?   
Amstutz (2001) focuses specifically on the role of religion in shaping foreign policy and provides a 
helpful outline for framing this question.  According to Amstutz, there are three ways that religious 
organizations can affect foreign policy.  First, , institutions may directly affect foreign policy.  In the 
1960s, 40 percent of members said that their churches should participate in the political process.  This 
grew to more than 50 percent by the 1990s.  Hence, there is an exchange between religious leaders and 
their members that allow religious organizations to lobby (in one way or another) for policy actions.  
Second, religious organization may also affect foreign policy through ideas. Because religious 
organizations deal with issues such as equality, just war, and subsidiarity, they can help to illuminate and 
influence perceptions of globalization and facilitate debate on foreign-policy issues.  As a result, religious 
values and norms play an indirect, not direct, role in the formation of foreign policy by affecting the 
attitudes of individuals and thereby shaping public opinion.  Finally, because religious organizations 
provide important humanitarian assistance, they can affect foreign policy through service.   
We argue that this second avenue of influence is important for trade and immigration policy 
decisions, in spite of the fact that there is little in the literature to date that examines the link between 
religious affiliation and attitudes toward global economic policies.  We suggest that future research also 
consider how the impact of religion on policy preferences is changing across generations of religious 
adherents.    19 
  
                                                
VI. Notes 
 
1 Jubilee 2000–named after the Old Testament concept of Leviticus 25:10 of returning land back to original owners–
is an example of the importance of organized religions on global policy. 
 
2  Independent institutions in each country collected the data for the ISSP.  Neither the original collectors nor the 
ZENTRALARCHIV bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretation presented here. 
3 In 1995, 1367 of the 2904 GSS respondents were administered the ISSP questionnaire. 
 
4 This difference is consistent with union positions on these two issues. For example, the AFL-CIO “Agenda For All 
America” (AFL-CIO, 2002) item (2) is “Keep good jobs and level the playing field.  In the past year alone, more 
that one million manufacturing jobs have fallen victim to flawed trade policies and inadequate protections for 
workers in the global economy.  We must develop an effective strategy and program for stopping the exports of 
good jobs and reindustrializing the U.S. economy.”  While John Sweeney (AFL-CIO, 2000), speaking on the 
Restoration of Fairness in Immigration Act stated:  “The AFL-CIO proudly stands on the side of immigrant workers. 
Throughout the history of this country, immigrants have played an important role in building our nation and its 
democratic institutions.”   
 
5 To test the sensitivity of these results to the year that was picked for constructing the dummy variables, we moved 
the year ahead five years and back five years and our results were consistent in terms of sign and significance.   
 
6 This grouping separates the 186 African Americans in the sample into 110 in fundamentalist denominations and 76 
who are not in fundamentalist denominations. 
 
7 Following the estimation of model 5 of both the trade question and the immigration question, we test for pair-wise 
equality and joint significance of the denomination dummies.  (The test statistic is a Χ
2.)  For the trade model, the 
null of pair-wise equality and jointly equal to zero is rejected with a p-value of 2.39 percent, and for the immigration 
model the null is rejected with a p-value of 1.05 percent, indicating that there is difference among the denomination 
coefficients and that they are jointly significantly different from zero.   
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Table 1:  Summary of Dependent Variables 
 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  The United States should limit the 
import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy. 
 
Response 1 Agree  Strongly 
Response 2 Agree 
Response   3  Neither Agree nor Disagree 
Response   4  Disagree 
Response 5 Strongly  Disagree 
Response   6  Can’t Choose, Refused 
Mean  Response    2.2589 
Standard Error of the Mean  0.0282 
Number of Respondents   1,367 
Observations    1,290 
Missing            77 
 
Do you think the number of immigrants to the United States nowadays should be: 
 
Response   1  Increased a Lot 
Response  2  Increased a Little 
Response  3  Remain the Same  
Response  4  Reduced a Little 
Response   5  Reduced a lot 
Response  6  Can’t Choose, Refused 
Mean  Response    3.8715 
Standard Error of the Mean  0.0330 
Number of Respondents   1,367 
Number of Observations  1,141 
Missing         226 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics on Independent Variables 
 
Variable Observations Missing  Number=1  Mean  SD  Minimum  Maximum
Noncitizen  1342          25 52 0.0416971  0.1999694  0 1
Female  1367            0 772 1.56474  0.4959724 1 2
Age  1363            4 NA 44.50183  16.56635 18 89
Social Class  1357            10 NA 2.453943  0.657592 1 4
South  1367            0 467 0.341624  0.4744278 0 1
African American  1367            0 186 0.1360644  0.3429824 0 1
   Fundamentalist  1365            2 110 0.0804682  0.2721162 0 1
   All Others  1365            2 76 0.0555962  0.2292241 0 1
Union Member  1361            6 180 0.1316752  0.3382611 0 1
Political Ideology  1299            68 NA 4.149346  1.364594 1 7
Education  1364            3 NA 13.42375  2.875641 0 20
Comparative Advantage  1360            7 270 0.1985294  0.3990396 0 1
Comparative Disadvantage  1360            7 54 0.0397059  0.1953391 0 1
Protestant  1365            2 794 0.5808339  0.4936032 0 1
   Moderate  1365            2 181 0.1324067  0.3390565 0 1
   Liberal  1365            2 190 0.1389905  0.3460632 0 1
   Fundamentalist  1365            2 413 0.3021214  0.4593456 0 1
Catholic  1365            2 318 0.2326262  0.4226605 0 1
   Pre-Vatican II Catholic  1365            2 204 0.1316752  0.3382611 0 1
   Post-Vatican II Catholic  1365            2 114 0.100951  0.3013741 0 1
   Post-Vatican II All Others  1365            2 371 0.2713972  0.4448433 0 1
Jewish  1365            2 32 0.0234089  0.1512537 0 1
Other Religion  1365            2 67 0.0490124  0.215973 0 1
Religiosity  1325            42 NA 3.707925  2.652589 0 8
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Table 3:  The United States should limit the import of foreign products.  Ordered probit results 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Noncitizen  0.422 0.436 0.416 0.418 0.375 
   [0.164]*** [0.166]*** [0.166]**  [0.166]**  [0.168]** 
Female  -0.106 -0.109 -0.114 -0.115 -0.113 
   [0.066] [0.067] [0.068]*  [0.068]*  [0.068]* 
Age  -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 
   [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]**  [0.002]** [0.003] 
Social Class  0.145  0.145 0.14 0.141  0.139 
   [0.052]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** 
South  -0.241 -0.261 -0.236 -0.238 -0.236 
   [0.068]*** [0.072]*** [0.072]*** [0.073]*** [0.073]*** 
African American  -0.193 -0.18 -0.149      -0.141 
   [0.099]** [0.101]*  [0.103]      [0.103] 
   Fundamentalist           -0.5    
            [0.162]***    
   All Others           -0.048    
            [0.152]    
Union Member  -0.463 -0.483 -0.493 -0.498  -0.48 
   [0.094]*** [0.097]*** [0.097]*** [0.097]*** [0.097]*** 
Political Ideology  -0.091 -0.094 -0.091 -0.093  -0.09 
   [0.023]*** [0.024]*** [0.024]*** [0.025]*** [0.024]*** 
Education  0.107 0.106 0.105 0.105 0.107 
   [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** 
Comparative Advantage  -0.077 -0.099 -0.097 -0.095 -0.089 
   [0.083] [0.086] [0.086] [0.086] [0.086] 
Comparative Disadvantage  -0.31 -0.3  -0.306  -0.297  -0.299 
   [0.176]* [0.181]* [0.181]* [0.181] [0.181]* 
Protestant     -0.172          
      [0.117]          
   Moderate        -0.065  -0.07  -0.08 
         [0.136]  [0.136]  [0.136] 
   Liberal        -0.147  -0.144  -0.162 
         [0.132]  [0.132]  [0.133] 
   Fundamentalist        -0.3  -0.269  -0.311 
         [0.124]**  [0.129]**  [0.124]** 
Catholic     -0.28  -0.299  -0.295    
      [0.123]**  [0.120]**  [0.120]**    
   Pre-Vatican II Catholic              -0.385 
               [0.136]*** 
   Post-Vatican II Catholic              -0.125 
               [0.165] 
   Post Vatican II All Others              0.045 
               [0.108] 
Jewish     0.006  -0.004  -0.001  -0.012 
       [0.238] [0.236] [0.236] [0.237] 
Other Religion      0.028 0.011 0.013 0.011 
       [0.177] [0.175] [0.175] [0.175] 
Religiosity      0.013 0.017 0.016 0.017 
       [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] 
Observations  1208 1174 1174 1174 1174 
*** significant at 1% or less, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, two-tailed test25 
Table 4:  The number of immigrants to the United States should be… Ordered probit results. 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Noncitizen  -0.676 -0.611 -0.605 -0.605 -0.501 
   [0.169]*** [0.171]*** [0.171]*** [0.171]*** [0.174]*** 
Female  0.11  0.097 0.101 0.102  0.1 
   [0.069] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] 
Age  0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 
   [0.002]*** [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002]**  [0.003] 
Social Class  -0.158 -0.147 -0.145 -0.146 -0.148 
   [0.055]*** [0.056]*** [0.056]*** [0.056]*** [0.056]*** 
South  0.07  0.036 0.035 0.038 0.038 
   [0.073] [0.076] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] 
African American  -0.236 -0.265 -0.272      -0.283 
   [0.106]** [0.110]** [0.111]**      [0.111]** 
   Fundamentalist           0.023    
            [0.173]    
   All Others           -0.371    
            [0.167]**    
Union Member  0.017  0.012  0.018 0.02 0.002 
   [0.099] [0.101] [0.101] [0.101] [0.102] 
Political Ideology  0.076 0.078 0.079 0.081 0.078 
   [0.025]*** [0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.026]*** [0.026]*** 
Education  -0.045 -0.044 -0.044 -0.044 -0.046 
   [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** 
Comparative Advantage  -0.079 -0.109 -0.104 -0.105 -0.124 
   [0.086] [0.089] [0.089] [0.089] [0.089] 
Comparative Disadvantage  -0.199 -0.191 -0.188 -0.202 -0.209 
   [0.185] [0.192] [0.192] [0.193] [0.192] 
Protestant     0.301          
      [0.126]**          
   Moderate        0.171  0.175  0.217 
         [0.144]  [0.145]  [0.145] 
   Liberal        0.203  0.201  0.258 
         [0.141]  [0.141]  [0.142]* 
   Fundamentalist        0.266  0.260  0.275 
         [0.132]*  [0.136]*  [0.132]** 
Catholic      0.108 0.036 0.031     
       [0.131] [0.127] [0.127]     
   Pre-Vatican II Catholic              0.296 
               [0.144]** 
   Post-Vatican II Catholic              -0.217 
               [0.174] 
   Post Vatican II All Others              0.114 
               [0.116] 
Jewish      -0.214 -0.285 -0.288 -0.235 
       [0.244] [0.242] [0.242] [0.242] 
Other Religion      0.137 0.067 0.066 0.082 
       [0.193] [0.190] [0.190] [0.190] 
Religiosity     -0.03  -0.028  -0.028  -0.029 
       [0.015]** [0.015]* [0.015]* [0.015]** 
Observations  1081 1049 1049 1049 1049 
*** significant at 1% or less, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%, two-tailed test 26 
Figure 1: US Should Restrict Imports
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